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Euthanasia:
Due Process for Death With Dignity;
The Living Will
LuIs KUTNER*
Euthanasia, or mercy killing, has become a subject of increasing in-
terest of late-and while no longer of mere theoretical concern, it is no
less a controversial topic.1 Indeed, the word "euthanasia" has such an
emotional impact itself that a new word, "benemortasia," has been coin-
ed for use in its stead.2 Perhaps an even better term here is "death with
dignity," which means ceasing to use extraordinary or heroic means to
prolong the life of a dying person.3
"Euthanasia" is derived from two Greek words which essentially
translate into"easy death."' 4 Eu, the first component part, means easy or
painless, while the other word, thanatos, means death.5 There are two
broad types of euthanasia: active euthanasia is the actual rendering of a
life-shortening agent;6 passive euthanasia is when certain measures that
might postpone death are not taken, though neither is anything done to
hasten death. In the latter case, as Dr. D. B. Hiscoe of Michigan State
University sees it, "[We are not really deciding who will die-everyone
dies. We are really deciding who will be made to live."'7
The act of euthanasia involves either a person taking his own life in
order to relieve his suffering or an outside person who takes the life of
another for the same reason.8 Thus, euthanasia is usually considered in
connection with a patient who is irrevocably unconscious or a terminal
patient who himself might request some sort of action to shorten his life.9
Resolving the life-death decision in favor of death can be made by the in-
dividual himselP ° or by another individual who, in the context of this
paper observes a person suffering in pain from an incurable disease or,
perhaps, a genetic deformity, and is hence motivated-not by malice or
personal profit, but out of a very human desire of compassion-to end that
*Chief Justice, World Court of Human Rights.
'Whittingham, Debating Death with Dignity, Chicago Tribune, September 27, 1974, at
10, col. 6 [hereinafter cited as Whittingham].
'Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1632, 1632 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Informed Consent].
'Whittingham, supra note 1.
'Id.
'Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Wil4 A Proposa 44 IND. L. J. 539, 540
n.3 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Kutner].
Informed Consent supra note 2, at 1632 n.5.7Snider, Why Patient's Death Wish Isn't Heeded, Chicago Daily News, Sept. 23, 1973.
'Whittingham, supra note 1.
'Informed Consent at 1632.
"Marcus, The Forum of Conscience: Applying Standards Under Free Exercise Clause,
1973 DUKE L.J. 1217, 1254 [hereinafter cited as Marcus].
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suffering.1 Beside the pain and suffering of a terminally-iUl patient,
among other considerations here may be the possible exhaustion of his
family's financial resources in providing health care that would merely
delay death through the use of expensive mechanical devices, contrary to
the will of both patient and family." (In speaking of a terminally-ill
patient, reference is made to a person facing imminent death; beyond
such a general definition- medical science itself has been unable to go,
given the problem of lucid intervals and remissions which the patient
might go through in turn. 3 )
Euthanasia raises a myriad of philosophical, medical, legal and
theological questions,' 4 although this debate has gone on for centuries
without any resolution."- The wish of a terminally-ill patient to forego fur-
ther medical treatment in order to prolong his life may conflict with the
interest and committment of those who provide health care, as well as
with existing state laws against suicide and homicide.'6 But can this be
called murder? It is one question that invariably arises in connection
with euthanasia. 7 Another is: "Why make an exception permitting
death?" Instead, perhaps a better question to ask is "What exceptions
should be made?' 1
8
Such questions suggest problems which could be created if euthanasia
were sanctioned. For example, since insurance companies do not pay life
insurance in the case of a suicide, would not euthanasia then become a
"luxury" for the wealthy? And what of a dying assault victim: if he were
put to death, would his attacker then be charged merely with assault or
with murder?19 Evidently, voluntary euthanasia seems too direct for
most of society, which, according to Ely, would prefer an "indirect"
taking of life as opposed to the shattering illusion of a direct one-with as
much adverse psychological impact on people here as the refusal of treat-
ment itself.20 Some see proposals for voluntary euthanasia as opening the
door for mass genocide because they think it incapable of providing the
necessary safeguards. 21
So euthanasia remains a moral-legal tangle in need of unravelling.
22
This paper shall endeavor to do that.
"Kutner; supra note 5, at 539-40.
12Informed Consent, at 1632.
13id
"Kutner, supra note 5, at 540.
"
5Marcus, supra note 10, at 1254.
"Informed Consent, supra note 2, at 1632, 1635.
7Kutner, supra note 5, at 539.
"'Informed Consent, supra note 2, at 1648.
"Whittingham, supra note 1.
2Informed Consent, supra note 2, at 1647, 1669.
"Kutner, supra note 5, at 549.
22Whittingham, supra note 1.
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Some Case Studies
That a person can lose his will to live is illustrated by the true story of a
marine who had been in a Viet Cong prison camp for two years. Major F.
Harold Kushner, a physician who himself spent five-and-a-half years as a
prisoner of war, related how this marine had, at first, maintained his
physical and mental health on assurances from the Viet Cong that he
would be released in time. But, when he finally learned he was not to be
released afterall, he soon grew depressed, refused to eat, and just lay on
his bed in a stupor. His fellow POWs were unable to bring him around
and, shortly thereafter, he died. This is but one case of a person who had
simply given up all hope that had previously sustained him.2 3
More appropos to the subject matter of this paper is the case of
columnist Bob Considine's younger brother who was suffering from the
effects of inoperable cancer of the pancreas. Out of brotherly devotion,
Considine took him to New York and registered him in Memorial
Hospital, where he was given pills, drugs, radiation treatment and placed
in an oxygen tent. Finally, Considine's brother said, "I know I'm dying.
Tell...those doctors to stop doing all these painfull things to me.
Tell...them to let me die in peace. '24
The late Stewart Alsop, himself suffering from leukemia, wrote of his
hospital room-mate, another terminal cancer patient, who would pitifully
cry out in pain all through the night. Alsop allowed that if the fellow were
a dog he would be chloroformed. "No human being with a spark of pity
could let a living thing suffer so, to no good end," concluded Alsop.
[A] human being's life is his own, to keep or to leave.... [A] man
of sound mind has every right to decide that the time has come
for his life to end....I am...suggest[ing] that a terminal patient
in full command of his faculties should be permitted to ask a
committee of experienced doctors about his future, and if he is
told that it holds nothing but suffering, and death at the end,
he should have the right to demand, and to receive, a pill or
some other painless means of ending his life. But the right to
end his own life should be his, not a doctor.2 5
Take, further, the example of an elderly woman, hellishly lingering in
her terminal illness for days or even weeks in a hospital room where she is
surrounded by tubes, bottles and other assorted apparatus meant to
treat her-but which has weakened her as much as the disease from
which she suffers; the combined torture of pain and drugs has so confus-
ed her mind that she cannot recognize her own family; if she can think at
all, perhaps her thoughts are simply of being relieved from her
"Submissive Death." Giving up on Life, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY. May 1974, at 80.
"Consodine, The Right to Die With Dignity, IRISH ECHO. Aug. 3, 1974, at 13.
25See, Alsop, The Right to Die With Dignity, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING. Aug. 1974.
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suffering. 6 Or, what of the Jehovah's Witness who voluntarily enters a
hospital for treatment? When advised that unless she is given a blood
transfusion she will die, the Witness tells her doctor she cannot consent
to that because of her deeply-held religious beliefs.2 7
There is also the case of Robert Waskir , a young college student, who,
on the pleading of his cancer-stricken mother, shot her three times as she
lay in her hospital room. Previously, he had tried to administer sleeping
pills to her. The Grand Jury of Cook County, Illinois, returned an indict-
ment of murder in the first degree against him, but after a trial of one
week, Waskin was freed by a jury, having deliberated only forty minutes,
on the determination that he was temporarily insane when he committed
the act. "He knew he shot his mother. That was not disputed," said the
jury foreman, "but prosecution failed to show he was of sound mind when
he did it." But Waskin himself had a very different response to the ver-
dict. "The moral issue of euthanasia...was not taken up...," he said after
the trial. "[I]t should have been faced squarely. Some day it will have to
be."'2 8 That is the primary purpose of this paper.
LEGAL PROBLEMS
Suicide & Homicide Laws
Related to euthanasia is the law on suicide, which under early common
law, was regarded as a criminal offense. Suicide was a felony, to be
punished by driving a stake through the body of the one who had commit-
ted suicide and then burying the corpse under a public highway; in addi-
tion, all lands, goods and chattel of the suicide victim were forfeited to
the king. This rule in England was tempered in 1824 to allow such bodies
to be buried in a churchyard-yet only between the hours of 9 o'clock
p.m. and midnight, and without religious ceremonies. Gradually, sanc-
tions against both body and property were removed as legal attitudes
toward suicide began to mellow, though an attempt by a person to end
his life is still considered an attempt to commit a felony in England,
albeit not an attempt to commit murder within the offenses against the
Person Act of 1861. Further, while suicide is no longer a crime under
English law, the aiding and abetting of suicide is. 29
English common law on suicide was never fully accepted in the United
States, and while once a crime, suicide is no longer such in some jurisdic-
tions, such as California. In Michigan, suicide is neither a statutory nor
common law crime. New York state has declared that suicide is not a
crime, but it nonetheless censured by statute as a great "public wrong"
2 6Whittingham, supra note 1.
'Marcus, supra n. 10, at 1251.
:'Kutner, supra note 5, at 539.29Id- at 543; Informed ConsenA supra note 2, at 1659-60, 1662.
[Vol. 54:201
EUTHANASIA
and promoting the attempt is a felony under penal law: the distinction
between accessory and principal have been abolished, and those so
involved are treated as principals in a homicide.30
So, assistance in euthanasia could amount to the crime of aiding and
abetting suicide.3 ' While some jurisdictions appear to distinguish situa-
tions where one has instigated or suggested to another that he commit
suicide from those situations where the idea came originally, the law, as a
rule, does not permit one to assist another in committing suicide
regardless of motive or if done at the request of the suicide victim. Any
immunity from suicide today actually means immunity of attempted
suicide, with the law varying in different jurisdictions as to aiders and
abettors. Where punishment of accessories is predicated on the criminal
character of the act of the principal, the aider or abettor enjoys im-
munity-the act of the principal not being a crime, as prevailing in Ger-
many and France. Other statutes specifically define aiding and abetting
as an independant crime.32
Texas was possibly the only state that viewed aiding suicide as non-
criminal, absent statute. Prior to 1974, anyone who aided or abetted
suicide was innocent of any violation of law inasmuch as suicide was not
a crime under state law. However, now aiding or attempting to aid a
suicide has become a statutory crime in Texas. Still, other states, absent
statute, are not precluded from adopting the old Texas common law view
on aiding and abetting suicide; and in Switzerland, a doctor is permitted
to put poison in a patient's hand but not to actually administer said
poison himself, thus the final act is performed solely by the patient and
the involvement of the third party is minimized-somewhat similar to
the Texas view before 1974.33
Suicide itself remains a crime in yet a few jurisdictions, as in North
Carolina, where it is regarded as a misdemeanor; or, in South Carolina,
where suicide retains its common law character as a felony. The argu-
ment advanced for such prohibitions against suicide are usually that
every life has a value to society-and if a life is taken the cost would be
too great in terms of psychological damage to that society, not to men-
tion the loss of productive potential; moreover, it is argued that one can-
not take his life without self-destruction. These decisions on self-
destruction may not be firmly held and may merely be pleas for help.
That is certainly the case of certain classes of people-though many take
their own lives out of a strong determination to do so, for reasons of
physical or social calamity, or the loss of a loved one. A study of suicides
among the elderly found just that, and they were neither insane nor men-
tally abnormal.3 4
"Kutner, supra note b, at 543; Informed Consent, supra note 2, at 1660.
MInformed Consent, supra note 2, at 1660.
"Kutner, supra note 5, at 543-44.33lnformed Consent, supra note 2, at 1661.
'4Id at 1660-2.
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Generally, the law does not appear to condone suicide, but the law has
proven to be adaptive to some situations where assistance to commit
suicide is given to one who freely requests it.35 It would seem that sanc-
tions against suicide would be less defensible when particularly applied
to a dying patient seeking some form of euthanasia.3 6 Nevertheless, the
law treats mercy killing no different from other cases involving the
taking of human life, at least conceptually. Common law does not
recognize motive as an element of homicide. If the proven facts establish
that a defendant did, in fact, kill wilfully (that is, had the intent to kill, as
a result of premeditation and deliberation), then there is murder in the
first degree regardless of motive; relevant evidence is needed only to
establish the degree of murder or homicide (premeditated).3 7 If another
assists a person to end his life, he is liable by this assistance to prosecu-
tion for murder even though the victim requested it, since consent is not
defense to homicide-except in some sports contests. 8 Even so,
prosecutors, judges, and juries have approached mercy killing cases dif-
ferently, thus making an exception to the rule of law existing as far as
practice is concerned. This has also served to create a gap within the legal
system with regard to euthanasia, and this absence of any governing
standards in this area certainly leaves much to be desired. The state of
law on euthanasia, such as it is, really lacks any definitiveness or objec-
tive criteria.3 9
Tracing Case Law
Sans symmetry of case law on euthanasia, it is perhaps best to review
chronologically how the courts have handled individual cases which have
had a legal bearing on this subject.
One of the earliest cases 40 held that if elements of wilful premeditation
exist, the perpetrator of the act stands equally condemned regardless of
the fact that he might have acted from an impulse of mercy. It is a
precept that had been reaffirmed since the time of this early nineteenth
century case in the United States, as well as in England.41
An important doctrine emerged out of medical malpractice suits and
the courts began to deal with the rendering of some treatment to which a
patient had not consented. 42 From such cases came the doctrine of in-
formed consent, and the landmark case in the area was Schloendorff v.
31Kufner, supra note 5, at 544.
3 Informed Consent supra note 2, at 1662.
"
7Kutner, supra note 5, at 542, 540.
38Informed Consent supra note 2, at 1650.39Kutner, supra note 5, at 542-43.
40People v. Kirby, 2 Park Grim. Rep. (N.Y.) 28 (1823).
"State v. Ehlers, 98 N.J.L. 326, 119 A. 15 (1922); Rex v. Simpson, 84 L.J.R. (n.s.) 1893
(K.B. 1915).
'
2Pratt v. Davies, 118 Ill. App. 161, 166, affd 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906).
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Society of New York Hospital.43 It was in that case that Judge Cardozo
opined that the principle of informed consent was meant to protect the
self-determination of individuals of sound mind, 4 the basic premise being
that every adult of sound mind had the right to determine what should be
done with his own body. Hence, it followed that if a competent patient re-
tains control over any decision about treatment, this right to consent
presupposes the right to refuse as well; for a patient's right to informed
consent would make no sense unless there was a right to an informed
refusal. Every man has the right, then, to forego treatment or even a cure
if it involves what, to him, seem intolerable consequences or risks, no
matter how distorted such values may be viewed by the medical
profession, just as long as the law itself does not regard them as incompe-
tent. The implication is that there exist categories of decisions that an in-
dividual must be permitted to make, even if the individual decides irra-
tionally or incorrectly. Basically, it is thus for the competent patient, who
has the right to define what his best interests are under the self-
determination principle of informed consent, to be able to withdraw his
consent at any time and discontinue treatment.45
The underpinnings of the informed consent axiom of self-determination
over one's body, according to Schloendorff, might be further explained in
terms more commonly applied in the law of torts from the standpoint
that tort law seeks to achieve an efficient allocation of resources. While it
also seeks other goals, general tort doctrine is concerned with placing the
responsibility for a particular decision on those individuals who can best
avoid whatever costs arise from such decision-making. The cost of
avoidance here includes those attempts to reduce the number and
severity of incorrect decisions, as well as the costs of gathering and con-
sidering information that go into making the decisions. It is in terms of
cost avoidance that decision-making for purposes of informed consent
might be evaluated, to wit: medically, a doctor, who is considered to be an
expert in diagnosis and treatment, can better determine than can a
patient-and at less expense-the desirability of a particular treatment;
yet, the doctor is not equipped to evaluate treatment in terms of a
patient's non-medical needs-psychological, social, and business-and,
moreover, the cost to the physician in discovering all these obligations
would be far too great. So, only the patient can sufficiently know his own
value preference, his own capacity for pain and suffering, his religious
beliefs and his uncompleted business and social plans for the future in
order to evaluate the desirability and maximum satisfaction of deciding
on a particular treatment. And, by alone knowing what is best for him as
an individual, he becomes the optimal cost avoider.4
41Schloendorff v. Society of Neff York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
"Id. at 129, 105 N.E. at 93. ,
O5Informed Consent, supra note 2, at 1634, 1643, 1648-49, 1664.
"Id. at 1643, 1645-6, 1648.
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Still, this issue of informed consent (which involves the right to a
natural death) has remained unsettled-although it has always received
considerable attention from the courts and commentators, many of the
latter viewing the doctrine as not really central to euthanasia. Courts
have applied the doctrine regularly in non-terminal cases and even in
some cases of terminal illness. The concern has been with voluntary
euthanasia, rather than with the involuntary euthanasia in a case of brain
death-although even that has been accepted by some courts.41
In the meantime, however, the decision in the People v. Roberts48 case
rendered at the beginning of the decade of the 1920s was of special im-
port to the matter of mercy killing. The defendant in this case was a hus-
band who had prepared poison and made it available to his wife, upon her
request, by placing it within her reach. The dying wife, confined in bed
with arteriosclerosis, drank the poison. The husband was found guilty of
murder in the first degree by the judge because he had assisted his wife,
who wished to die, by providing a means for her to commit suicide. Such
assistance was held to be murder and the man was sentenced to life im-
prisonment.
This particular case is noted because it was one of few where a mercy
killer has been convicted for murder. Perhaps this was due to the fact
that the case was not a jury trial, for juries have often disregarded the
dictates of the law and superimpo-ed their own beliefs in mercy killing
cases, as evidenced by the case of Robert Waskin, previously mentioned
here. Thus, what takes place at the trial level on mercy killing cases in-
dicates that the law in theory is actually quite malliable in practice. In
the judicial process dealing with mercy killings, the decision is often
based on what "is" rather than what "ought" to be, as there is a high in-
cidence of failure to indict, suspended sentences, acquittals (such as
finding a defendant innocent because of insanity), or a finding of guilt for
a lesser offense than murder when a killer has had mercy as a motive. It
would seem that, while there is opposition to mercy killing, there is,
nonetheless, sympathy for the killer, that is, the defendant. Since there is
usually a human interest aspect to mercy killing cases, they receive wide
press coverage and public attention. Unlike other acts of murder, the
public does not have the same revulsion toward mercy killings. The
tendency is to side with the defendant and not to favor the same type of
punishment society inflicts on other murders. During the Waskin trial,
for example, the judge, the defendant's father and lawyer all received let-
ters urging mercy be shown. And over forty years after Roberts, the case
of Suzanne van de Put, a Belgian woman who had killed her eight-day-
old, thalidomide-deformed daughter, gained international attention. Mrs.
van de Put went on trial in Liege for murder, along with her husband,
mother, sister and family doctor who were arraigned as abettors. The
17Id at 1645, 1634.4 PeopIe v. Roberts, 211 Mich. 187, 178 N.W. 690 (1920).
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defendants claimed to have acted from what they felt were unselfish
motives and popular sympathy was with them. The trial lasted only six
days, with the jury finally acquitting all five defendants-a verdict that
was met with general exultation.49
Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, U.S. courts considered a number of
relevant cases involving suicide; 0 but also during the latter decade there
was decided a case in the area of competency to consent, whereby it was
held that, while infdrmed consent need not be obtained from an incompe-
tent patient, it must be obtained from said patient's guardian. 1 Later, in
the In re Serferth case,52 decided in the following decade, there was no
guardian, however.
The year 1958 brought several important decisions from various
jurisdictions. One case53 illustrates how one trial court approached mercy
killing. The sixty-nine year-old defendant had suffocated his wife, a
hopeless cripple bedridden by arthritis. In arraignment proceedings, the
state waived the murder charge and permitted the defendant to enter a
guilty plea to the charge of manslaughter. The court then found the
defendant guilty of this charge on his stipulated admission of killing.
After hearing testimony of the defendant's children and pastor concern-
ing his unfailing care for and devotion to his wife's two-year illness, and
reading a letter from the deceased's doctor attesting to her excruciating
pain and mental despair, the court allowed the defendant to withdraw his
plea and entertained a plea of "not guilty," then so found him not guilty
because under the circumstances the jury "would not be inclined to con-
vict." Because there was no reason to be concerned about recidivism, the
court withheld the "stigma" of a finding and judgement of guilty by
allowing the defendant "to go home...and live out the rest of [his] life in as
much as [he] can find it in [his] heart to have." In following such a pro-
cedure in this case, the court was acting out of a sense of justice; the deci-
sion was based on the motives of the defendant-although this wds
unauthorized by statute. While the court had discretion to permit a
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea, that discretion was limited to those
particular instances where it would appear that there is doubt as to a
defendant's guilt, or that he has any defense at all worthy of considera-
tion by a jury, or, further, that the ends of justice will be served by sub-
mitting the case to a jury. However, these criteria were absent in this par-
ticular case.5 4
"Kutner supra note 5, at 540-42.
"See, Stiles v. Clifton Springs Sanitarium Co., 74 F. Supp. 907, 909 (W.D.N.Y. 1947);
State v. Campbell, 217 Iowa 848, 850, 251 N.W. 717, 718 (1933); Huntert v. Commercial
Travelers' Mut. Accident Ass'n. of America, 244 App. Div. 459, 460, 279 N.Y.S. 555, 556
(1935).
"Bonner v. Moran, 75 U.S. App. D.C. 156, 157-8, 126 F.2d 121, 122-3 (1941).
"In re Serferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 280 (1955).
"People v. Werner, Crm. No. 58-3636 (Cook Co. Ct., Ill. 1958).
"Kutner, supra note 5, at 541.
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The number of cases dramatically increased in the 1960s and early
1970s, especially insofar as informed consent was concerned. As the
decade of the 1960s began, the Schloendorff axiom on an individual's self-
determination was restated by a Kansas court in the noted case of Natan-
son v. Kline.5 The court, basing its opinion on the premise of thorough-
going self-determination under Anglo-American law, held that each man
must then be considered to be the master of his own body, and so may ex-
pressly prohibit the performance of surgery to save his life or any other
medical treatment-provided he was of sound mind. While a doctor might
feel an operation or some form of treatment was desirable or necessary,
the court stated that the law would not permit him to substitute his own
judgement for that of the patient by any form of artifice or deception.
Following Natanson during the 1960s, however, some courts refused to
recognize the doctrine of informed consent 56 and enforced the overruling
by doctors of patients' refusal of treatment. Such a case was that decided
in 1964 (among others) where the Appellate Court of the District of Col-
umbia "determined to act on the side of life" overruled the refusal of a
blood transfusion by a Jehovah's Witness.57 The court maintained that
the woman needed the transfusion to save her life and she was not in a
mental condition to make such a lifesaving decision. The decision sug-
gested that there was authority to apply anti-suicide sanctions to in-
dividuals seeking euthanasia for religious purposes, the court having
noted that when death results "from failure to extend proper medical
care, where there is a duty of care" it is manslaughter in the District of
Columbia.58
Future Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger, then a circuit
judge, dissented because he felt a hospital's effort to compel a person to
accept a blood transfusion against her will was not justifiable. "Some
matters of essentially private concern and others of enormous public con-
cern, he wrote, "are beyond the reach of private concern and others of
enormous public concern are beyond the reach of judges." [Emphasis
added]. Discussing the allocation of decision-making powers, Burger
quoted Mr. Justice Brandeis on "the right to be let alone" and avered
that such privacy includes refusal of medical treatment even at great
risk, no matter how foolish, unreasonable or absurd that notion may
seem.5 9 Of course, implicit in the weighing of interests competing in
decision-making is resolution by free choice.60 Yet, one need only look at
motorcycle crash helmet cases, for example, to see the difficulty in the
allocation of decision-making power for choices that apparently affect on-
"1186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
"6Informed Consen4 supra note 2, at 1633.
'
7Application of Pres. and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.
1964).
"8Id at 89 n.18.
11Id. at 98.
"Informed Consen4 supra note 2, at 1643.
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ly a given individual: in the same year one court found the helmet require-
ment invalid, since an individual was not held accountable to society, in
the eyes of that court, for any actions that concern no one but himself;6
1
but another court held the requirement valid.
62
Some courts accepted the Burger pronouncement that resolving the
issue of avoiding treatment is "beyond the reach of judges." In such life-
and-death decisions, the "free exercise" clause of the First Amendment
of our Constitution, which occupies a "preferred position" with other
constitutionally protected rights, began to take on a wider scope and ap-
plication in the courts-whereas before its newfound judicial flexibility,
individuals asserting the clause had not been very successful in state or
federal courts. Still other courts agreed with the majority opinion in the
D.C. case and saw the state as having the power to protect its citizens
against themselves even in the face of the "free exercise" clause. 63 In the
same year as the above D.C. case was decided, another court held that a
woman may be compelled to accept a blood transfer for her unborn child
since the unborn child is entitled to the law's protection.64 Also in the
following year, a court again took the position of protecting a citizen's
life even though this protection was against the individual's wishes.6 5
Nevertheless, no proper legal outcome to the question was settled upon
during that decade-and especially in one jurisdiction, New York, the
lower courts were most inconsistent. After Natanson but before the D.C.
case previously cited, a New York court followed the patient's wishes in
the interest of self-determination, ruling that a terminal patient, just as
one who is non-terminal, is entitled to refuse treatment.6 6 It extended the
right to refuse to the dying patient, giving him a choice on proffered
treatment like in any other medical situation. An Illinois case adopted a
similar approach three years later: the State Supreme Court upheld the
refusal of a blood transfusion by a Jehovah's Witness, a competent adult
who had steadfastly asserted her religious belief against such a transfu-
sion-despite the fact she was in extremis. The court noted that there
were no minors involved and no clear and present danger to society.6 7
However, in New York the same year as the D.C. case (1964 was
evidently a banner year for cases of this sort), a court compelled treat-
ment.68 Two years thereafter, though, a New York judge refused to in-
tervene in the dispute or treatment of an eighty year-old person suffering
6"American Motorcycle Association v. State Police, 11 Mich. App. 351, 158 N.W.2d 72,
73-4 (1968).
"
2 State ex. rel. Colvin v. Lombardi, 104 R.I. 28, 241 A.2d 625 (1968), aff'ld. State v. Lom-
bardi, 110 R.I. 776, 298 A.2d 141 (1972).
"Marcus, supra note 10, at 1218, 1220, 1254, 1271.
6"Raleigh Fitkin - Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 423, 201 A.2d 537,
538, cert. denied 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
"United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965).
"Erickson v. Dilgard, 94 Misc.2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (S. Ct. 1962).
'
7 In re Brooks' Estate, 32 IU.2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
"Collins v. Davis, 44 Misc.2d 622, 2524 N.Y.S.2d 624 (S. Ct. 1966).
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from gangrene; thus, the patient's apparent refusal of an operation
prevailed.69
Those courts that purported to apply the Schloendorff principle (as re-
stated in 1960 by Natanson) actually developed a wide variety of for-
mulations that served to inhibit realization of ultimate patient control.
Courts overlooked the patient's self-determination by either focusing on
the therapeutic privilege to withhold information or by basing its deter-
mination of the physician's liability on the disclosure standards of the
local medical community.70 Such judicial deviations appeared in a mix of
cases throughout the 1960s. Early in the decade one jurisdiction held
that the duty of disclosure was based on community standards requiring
only the disclosure of risks consistent with the practice of the local
medical community.7 1 That ruling was in common with most other
jurisdictions in the United States.7 2 But within a year one court had
abolished medical community standards and adopted in their place new
disclosure standards, while utilizing the reasonable man standard to re-
tain some limits on physicians liability.7 3 Also that year, another court
found liability for psychic injury-but only if disclosure was grossly
negligent, capricious, not well-founded and inducing harmful therapy.7 4
Further, in connection with Natanson, "any conflict between [the
doctor's primary duty to do what is best for the patient] and that of
frightening disclosure," opined a court four years after, "ordinarily
should be resolved in favor of the primary duty."75 And, as some courts
began adopting a negligence theory for informed consent in the
mid-1960s, it too differed greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction as to
what constituted risk.76
Through-out the decade of the 1960s a few cases stand-out because of
their relation to the subject of euthanasia, running from a case in which
assistance in a suicide was found to be manslaughter 77 to a later case in
which the court said that "protection of the safety of all...against conse-
quences of their own actions" was a legitimate use of a state's police
powers.7 8 Also worthy of note here is the dictum in the People v. Conley
case, where the strong indication was given that complicity in active
euthanasia even by a well-intentioned physician would constitute suffi-
cient malice for a murder prosecution. "[O]ne who commits euthanasia
bears no ill will toward his victims and believes his act is morally
"Petition of Nemser, 51 Misc.2d 616, 273 N.Y.S.2d 624 (S. Ct. 1966).
7°Informed Consent, supra note 2, at 1633.7
'DiFilippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 550, 173 A.2d 333, 339 (1961).
7"Informed Consent, supra note 2, at 1637.
"3Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962).
74Draus v. Speilberg, 37 Misc.2d 519, 236 N.Y.S.2d 143 (S. Ct. 1962).
"'Watson v. Clutts, 262 N.C. 153, 159, 136 S.E.2d 617, 621 (1964).
"Informed Consent, supra note 2, at 1633.
"'Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 343 Mass. 19, 175 N.E.2d 387 (1961).
78Bisonius v. Karns, 42 Wis.2d 42, 52, 165 N.W.2d 377, 382, appeal dismissed 395 U.S.
709 (1969).
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justified," said the court, "but he nonetheless acts with malice if he is
able to comprehend that society prohibits his act regardless of his per-
sonal belief. 7
9
Although the present decade has not yet ended, the volume of cases
already decided in this area is quite large, indeed.
A number of cases decided during 1971 took in the wider issue of con-
stitutional rights along with that of informed consent. This was initiated
by the John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston,80 where the court
ordered a blood transfusion in the interest of protecting a citizen's life,
thereby compelling a twenty-two year-old Jehovah's Witness to receive
the life-sustaining transfusion over her objections. The patient was paid
to have submitted to the doctor's "professional standard" by requesting
treatment and the doctor was to treat accordingly, not to terminate such
treatment before death."' But in another 1971 case, involving a Christian
Scientist, the court reversed the prior holding of a lower New York state
court, which in league with a health care provider, had forced a patient,
involuntarily committed to a hospital for treatment of an alleged mental
illness, to take tranquilizers over her religious objections. In its reversal,
the court found there was a cause of action under the 100 year-old Civil
Rights Act of 1871.82 Thus, the court drew a connection between the con-
stitutional doctrine of freedom of religion and the doctrine of informed
consent, with the former seeming to be a foundation for the latter. The
majority of the court had also based its decision on the distinction
between instances of harm to others and to self, which was "rarely if
ever...relevant in actuality because others are affected by virtually any
action...an individual takes or fails to take," according to the dissent of
one judge.83
Further, in 1972, it was held in In re Osborne, again involving a
Jehovah's Witness, that a competent and informed adult patient was en-
titled to refuse treatment on religious grounds over and against state in-
tervention-even if that treatment were to save the patient's life. The
court distinguished earlier cases involving compulsory rendition of
medical care to which patients objected on religious grounds, noting that
some cases involved comatose patients or other incompetents while, in
other cases, lives of unborn or the welfare of survivors were at stake.8 4 It
particularly distinguished Heston as protecting the lives of unborn
children.85 (That distinction may have later been weakened by Roe v.
Wade,86 which legalized certain abortions as within the zone of constitu-
tionally protected privileges. But even before Roe, in the same year as
"People v. Conley, 64 Cal.2d 310, 322, 411 P.2d 911, 918, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815, 822 (1966).
"John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
'Id at 583, 279 A.2d at 673.
"Winters v. Miller, 496 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert denied 404 U.S. 985 (1971).
83 Id.
"In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 374-75 (D.C. App. 1972).
"Id. at 374.
"6401 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Osborne, a court had suggested in a New Jersey case striking down a
state abortion statute as unconstitutional that there was no authority for
a state to infringe on constitutional rights for the purposes of general
welfare.8 7 Still, it should be noted that the Supreme Court in Roe did not
say that there was any right to do with one's body as one pleased.88
Osborne stressed that whether the patient's "current choice is com-
petently maintained" is to be the ipportant thing.8 9
In a final 1972 case, In re Green, involving a family of Jehovah's
Witnesses, the state of Pennsylvania brought an action to have a guar-
dian appointed for a 14-year-old patient whose parents would not allow
him to have a blood transfusion for a spinal fusion operation. The court
failed to find any showing that the child's life was in imminent danger
and upheld the free exercise interest of the patient (which interest had
been expanded in the Supreme Court culminating in a case decided
during this same year).9 1 However, the court in Green remanded the case
to determine if the child agreed with his parent's decision concerning the
blood transfusion.92 Courts have appointed requested guardians if the
patient was a minor or mentally incompetent, but there is also conflict
whenever an individual is capable of making rational choices.9 3
As commentators Harper and James have declared, "Individual
freedom... is guaranteed only if people are given the right to make choices
which would generally be regarded as foolish ones. Thus, the Jehovah's
Witness should have the legal right to refuse-on religious grounds
which seem mistaken to most of us-the blood transfusion which is need-
ed to save his life.... " 9 4
A trial of cases from 1972-Cobbs,95 Wilkinson,9 6 and Canterbury97
abolished medical community standards on disclosure and formed new
tests for disclosure by each taking different approaches toward that
issue.
In Cobbs the court opted for a standard more protective of the
patient's rights, requiring disclosure of known risks of death or serious
bodily harm. The court was viewing insufficient disclosure of risks and
alternatives as a failure to exercise due care, the failure of obtaining in-
formed consent being a tort of negligence.
In speaking of the patient's need for information, the court says the
test for adequate disclosure encompasses "whatever is material to the
"Y.W.C.A. v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048, 1073 (D.N.J. 1972).
"Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
"In re Osborne, 294 A.2d at 375.
"In re Greene, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d (1972).
"Wisconsin v.Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1974).
92In re Greene, supra note 90.
"Marcus, supra note 10, at 1252.
"Quoted in Informed Consen, supra note 2, at 1748.
"Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
"Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972).
"Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 722(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
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decision."98 But that standard is left undefined and no clear test is
arrived at as to whether the court is talking about an objective test
(based on the so-called "reasonable man") or subjective test (based on the
individual patient).
Moreover, Cobbs allowed a waiver of the right to disclosure by a com-
petent patient; and if he expresses that wish the doctor is then advised to
exercise therapeutic privilege in withholding information from him.9
The Rhode Island Supreme Court in Wilkinson decided that a patient
must be given all necessary material information, the charter of which
could not be determined by "a local medical group" having no knowledge
of the individual or unique situations involved. It was further noted that
informed consent is based on the right of the patient "to be the final
judge to do with his body as he wills"-a right that "should not be
delegated to a local medical group." Wilkinson employed a reasonable
man test-the objective standard-with regard to the withholding of in-
formation. 10 The test was "isolated" and "concentrated" to apply only
to determining the required scope of disclosure. 01 The doctor was held
responsible only for disclosing all facts and risks a reasonable man would
deem material.
The court in Wilkinson recognized that a physician might feel a patient
would be "upset" by information and so withhold relevant facts on the
familiar grounds of therapeutic privilege. From that, it concluded that no
disclosure was necessary if "it would unduly agitate or undermine an
unstable patient.' 0 2
The situation in the Canterbury case is similar to that of Wilkinson in
that the treatment performed was not consented to. The court in Canter-
bury said that informed consent requires a competent, non-terminal
patient in a non-emergency situation to be given a chance to consent or
refuse. The court stressed the competency of the patient out of recogni-
tion of the importance of comprehending the information conveyed.
Because the patient lacks the expertise of a doctor, he must rely heavily
on the doctor for information about the nature and quality of the treat-
ment. 0'
On a patient's refusal, the court in Canterbury noted that an ideal rule
governing disclosure should require that all risks which the patient
would feel material be revealed; yet, the court was aware that such a sub-
jective rule would place an "undue demand" on a doctor to "second-
guess" the patient. So the court applied both the reasonable man test and
an objective causation test. Under this combined test, the more severe or
likely the risk, the more probable the facts are material.104 The focus here
"Cobbs. v. Grant, 8 Cal.3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (1972).
991d.
10°Wilkinson v. Versey, 110 R.I. 606, 626, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (1972).
"'Informed Consent, supra note 2, at 1642.
102Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. at 628, 295 A.2d at 689.
"'Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 780-83, 790-91.
"'Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 780-83, 790-91.
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is on the magnitude of risks and the liklihood of their occurance as
perceived by the reasonable man. In so doing, the test would seem to
clearly put a doctor on notice as to the necessity of disclosure.105
The Canterbury opinion also moved in the direction of viewing the in-
vocation of therapeutic privilege as the equivalent of asserting a patient
incompetent. The court rejected likening the claim of therapeutic
privilege to conceal information to that of asserting the community stan-
dard against disclosure. Instead, it cut back on therapeutic privilege. The
"privilege to withhold information for therapeutic reasons must be
carefully circumscribed," decided the court so that it would not "devour
the disclosure rule itself." While placing only an outer limit on the
privilege, the court still suggested that if the privilege were exercised
there should be disclosure to the closest relative. 06
Another 1973 case, similar to a 1966 case from the same jurisdiction, as
previously cited, resulted very differently result when a judge appointed
a guardian to consent to an operation on an 84-year-old suffering from
gangrene despite a dispute as to what his wishes were. 07 But when a
sixty year-old woman suffering from cancer refused life-saving surgery,
giving as a reason that she had fears over such an operation-fears other
witnesses suggested were based on the belief that the surgery would pre-
vent a movie career, a lower court in Pennsylvania held that this chronic
undifferentiated schizophrenic was nevertheless sufficiently competent
to refuse, although some might consider her reasons irrational. But the
court allowed her to make this decision, using as its test that of the
patient's capacity to comprehend the situation's risks and alternatives,
sans any examination of whether the patient's choice is rationally or
dispassionately conceived. So, in the eyes of the court, a terminal patient
who had decided to die for reasons irrational to others should have that
decision honored, since informed consent protects all the decisions of a
competent patient. 0 8
In upholding this schizophrenic's right to refuse, the court in Yetter,
above, recognized a connection between that right and the right of
privacy, referring to Roe v. Wade, where the U.S. Supreme Court based
its decision on the 14th Amendment right to privacy vis-a-vis the in-
terests of the state. 09 Of course, the constitutional right to privacy had
already been recognized by the Supreme Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut." 0 The Court in Roe claimed that the committment to self-
determination and privacy presupposes a disposition to permit activities
whose adverse impact on others would be only psychological."' Said the
"'°Informed Consent supra note 2, at 1690.
'°6Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 789.
"'Center v. Levitt, 73 Misc.2d 395, 342 N.Y.S.2d 356 (S. Ct. 1973). See note 74,supr.
"°'In re Yetter, Civil No. 1973-533, at 2-3, 5 (Pa. C.P. N'ampton Co., June 6, 1973).
'9410 U.S. 113 (1973).
"10381 U.S. 476 (1965).
"'Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113.152-56 (1973).
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lower court in Yetter.
In our opinion the constitutional right of privacy includes the
right of a mature competent adult to refuse to accept medical
recommendations that may prolong one's life and which, to a
third person at least, appear to be in his best interests, in
short, that the right of privacy includes a right to die with
which the state should not interfere where there are no minor
or unborn children [actually departing from the sum and
substance of the Roe ruling here] and no clear and present
danger to public health, welfare or morals. If the person was
competent while being presented with the decision and in
making the decision which she did, the court should not in-
terfere even though her decision might be considered unwise,
foolish or ridiculous. 11
2
It now appeared that informed consent was being viewed as a
manifestation of constitutionally protected rights.113 Another case from
1973 seems to have borne this out when it was further decided that the
denial of retirement benefits to an employee whose religion prohibited
life-saving surgery, thus rendering her disabled, was an unconstitutional
infringement on her free exercise of religion. 1 4
Two of the most recent decisions rendered have further contributed to
case law here. They are important, each in their own way: In Lacy, the
court overtly ignored the individual values of the patient. The facts of the
case were that a blood transfusion was recommended for an infant in
Florida, but the child's parents were Jehovah's Witness and flew the boy
to a Texas hospital which treated such patients without transfusions. It
was alleged that the doctor in Florida notified the hospital and welfare
unit in Texas that the infant was in immediate danger of death. The
welfare unit then obtained a court order-sans notice- making the child
a ward of the state. The sheriff next transferred the infant to a general
hospital where the boy received a blood transfusion over the complaints
of the plaintiffs."' Some feared this action might lead others in similar
circumstances to avoid or delay consulting a physician because their
values might be disregarded, and, by neglecting to seek medical advice,
risk the deterioration of health standards at the cost of society.16
In the second current case, it was held that the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare regulations were arbitrary and unreasonable
since they did not sufficiently protect welfare clients against coercion. 1 7
In the regulations in question, HUD had defined the doctrine of informed
consent as "the knowing consent of an individual or his legally
11in re Yetter, supra note 108 at 4.
"'In formed Consent, supra note 2, at 1644.
"
4Montgomery v. Board of Retirement, 33 Cal. App.3d 447, 109 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1973).
"'Lacy v. Harris Co. Welfare Unit, Civil No. 74-H-129 (S.D. Tex., filed Jan. 22, 1974).
"Informed Consent, supra note 2, at 1646.
"'Relf v. Weinberger, 392 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974).
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authorized representative, so situated as to be able to exercise free power
or choice without undue inducement or any element of force, fraud,
deceit, duress and other forms of constraint or coercion.... 118 Coerced
consent could take the form of subtle pressure from others, unconscious
motivation, or simply a failure to comprehend information in the form
conveyed. Particularly vulnerable to the influence of family members,
drugs, pain, and financial problems is the terminal patient. That poses a
special problem, increasing the number and frequency of incorrect and ir-
reversible decisions on the part of the patient. There is a greater cost to
society here imposed than if the responsibility were placed on the state,
for example. But, indeed, the thrust of the above decision implies that the
state should do more to protect an individual from such coercion. In for-
mulating a suitable test in order to handle the problem of coercion, it has
been suggested that the state can structure its approach along those
lines whereby the relatively uncoerced patient can alone make the
ultimate decision as to treatment, with the state itself striving to assure
that he makes it with true understanding. It may be asserted, on the
other hand, that the state, if it has an interest here, should then override
the expressed will of the patient."9 Yet, as can be seen through-out this
chronological review of case law, it has been questioned from time to time
as to whether the mere fact an individual wishes to resolve the decision of
life or death in favor of the latter should automatically give rise to any
strong state interest whatever. 12'
In case law effecting euthanasia, the judicial process has treated mercy
killing differently than murder with malice.'2 ' However, few cases on the
issue of liability for euthanasia ever reach the courts, due, in part, to
prosecutorial discretion, or, for the larger part, difficulty of proof, or,
more simply, failure of authorities to discover the act (morphine, for ex-
ample, is an easily disguised death-inducing agent). Moreover, crim-
inality of inaction by physicians has not been generally decided by the
courts, especially in America.2 2 As a matter of fact only two prosecutions
of doctors for murdering dying patients have been recorded in American
and British law. Yet, those courts that have upheld the doctrine of in-
formed consent in the numerous cases cited above, have, in fact,
recognized the right of a competent patient to forego treatment. 23
Although some courts, questioning the validity of the Schloendorf ax-
iom, have stressed concerns countervailing that principle, most recent
cases abolishing the medical community standard rule on disclosure have
returned to a position of greater consistency with Schloendorf. '2 So case
"'Quoted in Informed Consent supra note 2, at 1633.
11Id. at 1656-57.
' 'Marcus, supra note 10, at 1254.
'Kutner, supra note 5, at 549.
'
2Id- at 548.
'"Informed Consent supra note 2, at 1662, 1664.
"'Id., at 1631.
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law has evidently come full-circle. Concerns over the psychological im-
pact on society of refusing treatment has not been strong enough to over-
come the law's committment to an individual's decision-making with
regard to his or her own medical treatment. 125 Such decisions must rest
with the patient, and the law will recognize the right to consent to or
refuse treatment-even when a patient is in extremis-whether it be an
infection or an operation to extend life, providing the patient is capable of
giving consent and that that consent is both voluntary and informed.
This right has been further buttressed by the constitutionally recognized
right to privacy. If a patient is incapable of giving his consent (he may be
unconscious), constructive consent to life-saving treatment may be
presumed, but how far such constructive consent should be extended is
to be answered on the basis of the best available evidence according to
the rule of law that merciful termination of life shall be decreed.
126
The courts must take care so there will be no accretions of the doctrine
of informed consent that will diminish the patient's entitlement to
receive information on risks involved and to consent before treatment.
These two elements-information and consent-are, of course, essential
to the doctrine, but they are not as settled in the courts as is a third ele-
ment: the concept that a patient must comprehend the information con-
veyed, which the courts have more fully developed since the notion of in-
formed consent itself came into being. Some courts have joined the con-
cept of determining competency with the use of therapeutic privilege
(which a doctor could abuse as a loophole through which to avoid pro-
viding information for informed consent). These courts expand
therapeutic privilege into the presumption of incompetency, resulting in
a possible denial of a patient's right to make his own decision on
euthanasia. To safeguard patients' interests, adequate legal tests on
competency should be carefully formulated by the courts instead, in
order that patients will not be so manipulated. Unfortunately, courts
have been lax in considering such tests. In addition to the judicial per-
missiveness of therapeutic privilege, courts trending in the direction of
holding a doctor liable for even honest, though frightening, disclosures
should re-examine such an approach, for it may impede the flow of
material information to the patient. In its place, the law should concen-
trate on developing the duty to inform the patient fully, yet tactfully, of
material information, however distressing, so that, in the interest of in-
formed consent, he can make an informed decision. 1 7
Another area that has not received extensive attention (at least not on
the appellate level) is the measure of damages to be recovered in an in-
formed consent tort action, as the cases above demonstrate. For there to
be cause for tort liability, it would have to be proven that damages
resulted from concealment; though any requirement that the patient
"Id., at 1664.
"'Kutner, supra note 5, at 547, 549-50.
MI7 nformed Consent supra note 2, at 1631, 1636-7, 1651-2, 1659.
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show he would have been better off had he undergone alternative treat-
ment would lead to the introduction of highly speculative considerations
in many cases as to proofs for damage. It is for the courts, however, to
develop a tort doctrine on informed consent-and only they can achieve
it.12 8
Legislative Responses
Euthanasia has also been a subject of legislative, as well as judicial,
consideration. 29 Given the uncertainties of suicide and homicide laws,
legislation authorizing some sort of euthanasia seems to be desirable. 30
But, for others, legislative ends are to preserve human life, and, to date,
all proposals to legalize voluntary euthanasia have been rejected. 13 1
Noted legal scholar Glanville Williams long urged enactment of a
statute to permit voluntary mercy killing, which was backed by pro-
ponents of euthanasia in both the United States and England. It was
originally designed to establish a means of immunizing relatives or physi-
cians in administering means of ending life upon the request of a patient
who was suffering great pain from an incurable, fatal disease. 32 The
Williams proposal would recognize the de facto power of the health care
provider by leaving the rendition of euthanasia to the discretion of the
doctor and, thus, minimizing the risk of litigation. However, by legally
utilizing the doctor's discretion over the decision of euthanasia, rather
than having it made by the patient himself, Williams disregarded inform-
ed consent."13
The House of Lords in England defeated a bill to allow voluntary
euthanasia for Britain in 1969. The opponents charged that it would
allow "suicide by proxy." This is one of many arguments raised against
voluntary euthanasia proposals. It is further asserted that such laws
would prove too cumbersome if applied and could not provide the
necessary safeguards.' 34 To be sure, in order to provide the latter, the sick
room would have to become overly "bureaucratized," and the period bet-
ween the request for euthanasia and its actual rendition could be quite
long.' 3' But the greatest objection to such proposals seems to be the fear
that they could open the door to possible mass euthanasia and genocide
to eliminate the aged or the congenitally defective. This "entering
wedge" theory finds support in the Nazi experience in Germany:
euthanasia was expanded from the "voluntary" stage to the elimination
of the mentally ill and defective, and finally as a rationale for genocide.
8I., at 1641, 1644.
"'Marcus, supra note 10, at 1253.
.'Informed Consent, supra note 2, at 1659.
"'Kutner, supra note 5, at 545, 549.
"'-Id., at 544-45.
... Informed Consent, supra note 2, at 1650-51, 1659.
"'Kutner, supra note 5, at 547, 549.
'.Informed Consent, supra note 2, at 1663.
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Thought was even given to eliminating all cardiac patients, as well. (To-
day, under the German legal system, though, the approach toward mercy
killing is that there should neither be exculpation nor reduction of
sentence where death is administered for the benefit of persons other
than a suffering patient. The failure of a doctor to artificially prolong a
painful life is not regarded as a homicide as long as the victim is in-
curably ill. Otherwise, there is a duty to act and intent to cause death is
punishable as homicide.)36 That legalized voluntary euthanasia might
soon lead to involuntary euthanasia ignores the main difference between
the two: informed consent-a greater difference than exists between ac-
tive or passive euthanasia (act vis-a-vis omission). So, the legal definition
of euthanasia could be limited to include only those terminal patients
who gave their informed consent, thus preventing mercy killing of any
non-consenting terminal patients.1
3 7
Euthanasia legislation has fared little better in America than in
England. Despite bills in many state legislatures relative to absolving
physicians of any liability, none has yet been passed.1 3 8 The American
Euthanasia Society supported one proposal that was unsuccessfully in-
troduced in bill form in both the Nebraska and New York legislatures.
Under the proposal, an eligible patient would have petitioned for
euthanasia in the presence of two witnesses. The petition would then be
filed, along with a certificate from an attending physician in a court of ap-
propriate jurisdiction. This court would next appoint a committee of
three, at least two of whom would be physicians. The committee would
forthwith examine the patient and other such persons as they deemed
advisable or the court might direct. Within five days the committee was
to report back to the court on whether or not the petition should be
granted.' 9
Other legislative attempts at legalizing passive euthanasia were made
in Florida and Oregon. Opponents of the bill in the Florida legislature
were successful in memorializing Congress to pass a constitutional
amendment to prohibit both active and passive euthanasia before the
passive euthanasia bill could again be re-introduced. The Oregon bill died
in committee, though the state medical society was behind it; the general
public, however, was not. This brought the sponsor of the bill to the
realization that such a bill was not politically feasible but a "political
liability" instead. Therefore, he "reluctantly" concluded not to re-
introduce the bill and to "depend on social education" to change public
opinion before going the legislative route again. And although a Patient's
Bill of Rights was enacted in Minnesota, it did not include the right to
'
36Kutner, supra note 5, at 545-6, 548.
'
3VInformed Consent supra note 2, at 1663.
"'Reinhold, Facing the Last Taboo: Death, Chicago Tribune, July 28, 1974, Sec. 2, at 1
[hereinafter cited as Rheingold].
'
39Kutner, supra note 5, at 544-45.
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refuse treatment. 140
Still, lawmakers need to generate adequate legal measures that will
permit death with dignity, and, to that end, legislation should dispel any
fear of possible criminal liability in cases of voluntary euthanasia.
Legislation reducing fear of liability for complicity in certain forms of
voluntary euthanasia would allow the patient's wishes to be honored, for,
with liability removed, more deference to the patient's wishes would
surely be expected. 141 Criminal codes can be adapted to meet the situa-
tion. One suggestion is to return to motive (rather than intent) in criminal
law here as other legal systems have done. For example, under modern
European codes motive is considered relevant in classifying offenses.
There could then be a milder punishment than in other homicides for an
accused who had killed at the request of the victim suffering in great pain
from an incurable disease. So, if the renderer of euthanasia has good
motive he will be punished-if punished at all-for a lesser offense than
murder."4 Further, the prohibition of suicide could be limited to non-
terminal cases by changing the definition of suicide to clearly exclude
voluntary passive euthanasia.
143
ETHICS & EUTHANASIA
Medical & Theological Ethics
Doctors feel they have a duty to act in the best interest of their
patients, as they perceive that duty, according to professional standards
based on the theory of medicine under which they are trained.144 Medicine
is seen as the implacable foe of death,1 4 5 and, given the advancements in
medical technology,1 4 6 it is possible today for medical science to prolong
life artifically through mechanical methods to keep such vital functions
as circulation and respiration going;1 4  moreover, operations to
transplant human organs, like a heart or kidney, have now become
routine due to these advances: they give patients a second chance at
life.1 48 But in other cases, it is not human life that is prolonged but merely
vegetation.149 Still, as one doctor admits about many of his colleagues,
they "have a dread of death so great they can scarcely function in its
"'Informed Consen4 supra note 2, at 1634.
11Id at 1659, 1663-64.
"'Id. at 1651; Kutner, supra note 5, at 546, 549.
"'Informed Consent, supra note 2, at 1662.
'"Id at 1649.
14'Rice, Euthanasia: A Time to Live and A Time to Die-How Physicians Fee
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Sept. 1974 at 29 [hereinafter cited as Rice].
"'Reinhold, supra note 138.
"
7 Whittingham, supra note 1.
"'Dempsey, Who Shall Live...and Who Shall Die?, Chicago Daily News, Oct. 19, 1974, at
19.
"'Whittingham, supra note 1.
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presence.' ' 50 Thus, doctors usually follow the route of doing everything
within their power to prolong life.151 That is how they are psychologically
oriented: to "win. ' '1 52
Yet what of the best interest of the patients as the patient himself
views it? That should be the primary duty of the physician when he acts.
Indeed, there is evidence to show that a majority of the American public
want to be able to tell their doctors to let them die if they are suffering
from an incurable disease. Of those sampled in a 1973 Harris Poll, 62%
favored this approach, while 28% felt it was wrong and 10% were
undecided. 153 And in a Gallup Poll, 52% said they would support a law to
end a patient's life by some painless means, at his request or that of his
family, if he had an incurable disease.14 The result of that poll certainly
represented a change of attitude, for in 1950 only 36% thought a doctor
should be allowed to induce painless death for an incurable patient if that
patient or his family so requested."5
There is also evidence, however, that doctors themselves may be
changing their own attitudes toward euthanasia. Surprisingly, in a
survey reported in mid-1974, 79% of physicians responding expressed
some belief in the right of the patient to have a say about his death. "6 The
subject of death has also become an important part of medical school cur-
riculum, whereas in the past there was a tendency to neglect it in other
than a strictly clinical sense. 117 Moreover, at its annual conference, the
austere American Medical Association formally adopted the following
policy statement: "The cessation of the employment of extraordinary
means to prolong the life of the body where there is irrefutable evidence
that biological death is imminent is the decision of the patient and-or his
immediate family...." This provided doctors with a sanction for what
many had actually been doing for some time, since the practice of turning
off machines, for example, to allow death to come to a patient whom only
the machine is keeping alive is a fairly common practice for hospitals.1"8
As a matter of fact, doctors at the Yale University School of Medicine
willingly acknowledged that they had quietly allowed 43 severely
deformed infants to die by -withholding treatment after the parents
agreed there was little chance for "meaningful life." The doctors
disclosed this in hopes of breaking down "a major social taboo."'159
Returning to the physician's poll mentioned above, what objections
there were to euthanasia seemed to be based on religious grounds rather
'.Informed ConsenA supra note 2, at 1658.
"'Snider, supra note 7.
'"Informed Consent, supra note 2, at 1648.
'"Id at 1649, 1658; Whittingham, supra note 1.
"'Informed Consent, supra note 2, at 1658.
"'Reinhold, supra note 138.
"'Rice, supra note 145, at 29.
"'7Reinhold, supra note 138, at 1.
'"Whittingham, supra note 1.
"'Reinhold, supra note 138, at 1.
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than on the major specialties or age groups of the responding doctors. Of
the 933 doctors who answered the questionaire, those with no religious
affiliation were most likely to be found among the 20% who totally agree
that patients should "have a right to choose how they die by making
their wishes known to their physicians before serious illness strikes."
(Overall, 38% in the random sample agreed with that in most cases, and
another 21% agreed in some cases.) However, Catholics were the least
likely to accept the idea that a patient had a right to influence his own
death. Likewise, when asked what they would do "if ... a member of your
family were suffering from terminal illness, which you as a physician
knew carried little or no hope for survival"-a question to which nearly
two-thirds reacted by saying that would "take no heroic measures" to
keep the patient alive, most Catholic doctors opted for keeping the
patient alive; among those 11% who would resort to the positive action of
ending the suffering (euthanasia, of course), two-thirds were either
Jewish or without religion.1 60
The position of Catholic theologians has been that a doctor is obliged to
take all ordinary means, including those medicines and treatments which
can be used without causing unnecessary pain or expense (as may be coin-
cident with the legal obligation to exercise due care), in order to preserve
a patient's life; but this excludes any extraordinary means. 1 ' The
Vatican has now issued an authorative statement on the ethics of mercy
killing and the parameters within which it shall be acceptable. A majority
of other churches in the United States .have also subscribed to similar
points of view.162 Fprthermore, last year a Jesuit priest, Father Richard
G. McCormick of the Kennedy Center for Bioethics at Georgetown
University, proposed that grossly deformed infants should be allowed to
die if their "potential for human relationship...is simply non-existent or
would be utterly submerged and undeveloped in the mere struggle to sur-
vive." Father McCormick noted that though modem medicine has in-
creased the power to preserve life, with that has come the added respon-
sibility to make judgements about the quality of life to be saved. To that
end, he has proposed the following guidelines "that may help in the deci-
sion about sustaining...lives": the individual decision to end life of such
infants must be borne by the parents in consultation with their doctor,
and the decision should only be made in terms of what is good for the
child. He also offered some caveats, allowing that mistakes will be made
because human decisions are involved and cautioning that the death of
these infants does not imply that some lives are more valuable than
others or that there is such a thing as a life not worth living. Still, Father
McCormick concludes, "It is neither inhuman nor un-Christian to say
that there comes a point where an individual's condition itself represents
'
6 0Rice, supra note 145, at 29-30.
1'6Kutner, supra note 5, at 548.
16
2Whittingham, supra note 1.
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the negation of any truly human potential. '163
It has been asserted that the Judeo-Christian ethic forbids taking a
life-even if that life will irreversibly end in painful death.164 But some
theologians claim that forms of religion stressing the promise of life after
death merely use religion for selfish purposes. "This enormous emphasis
on immortality," announced Krister Stendahl, Dean of Divinity at Har-
vard University, "was not in Judaism or early Christianity...." Perhaps,
now there will be a return to a purer form of religion based simply on faith
in God. At any rate, theologians are giving new attention to what human
mortality means and they are raising those long neglected questions over
the real purpose of human existence.6 5
New Standards of Ethics-A Right to Die
Out of society's concern for preserving human life, the state may feel
justified in forbidding voluntary euthanasia. After all, the underlying
values of our society and Constitution uphold the right to life-and its
protection is basic to any legal system. That is the prime justification, in
fact, for the state's existence, according to Hobbes. However, it may well
be argued that to forbid voluntary euthanasia is an infringment of the
constitutionally recognized right of privacy, as derived from the 4th or
9th Amendments or the due process clause of the 5th Amendment.166 In
the interest of privacy, society ought to opt for an approach that will en-
courage self-determination, for voluntary euthanasia is not espoused
merely as a relief for pain; rather, it is to preserve for the terminal patient
his last meaningful freedom: control over the time of his death. Certainly,
in such a case, there is the same right of self-determination for death as
there is for life. 67
Strangely enough, though, given our advocacy of man's free will and
the constitutional rights of the individual, he cannot relieve his suffering
when all hope for recovery is lost.168 Glanville Williams, the strong pro-
ponent of voluntary euthanasia, held there was a human freedom to end
one's life. He contended that the law could not forbid conduct that, albeit
undesirable, did not adversely affect the social order 6 9 This view was
similar to that advanced by John Stuart Mill, who based his concept of
freedom of choice on instances which had a direct adverse effect on no one
but the decision-maker himself.'7 0 "Each is a proper guardian of his own
health, whether bodily or mental or spiritual," wrote Mill. "Mankind are
163Hausner, Jesuit Backs Mercy Death for Grossly Deformed Babies, Chicago Daily
News, July 8, 1974, at 38.
"1'Whittingham, supra note 1.
"'Reinhold, supra note 138, at 1.
'66Kutner, supra note 5, at 539, 545.
"'Informed Consent supra note 2, at 1657-58.
'
6 5Whittingham, supra note 1.
'69Kutner, supra note 5, at 545.
"'Informed Consen4 supra note 2, at 1643-44.
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great gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves,
than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest." And for Mill,
"the sole end for which mankind are warranted...in interfering with
liberty of action.... is self-protection.'"1 7' But Mill did make an exception
to his doctrine of an individual's sovereignty over his own mind and body
by applying it to the mature only, since he did not feel a child or young
person not yet of age legally should be asked to make such life and death
decisions; the minor was to be under the protection of the state.'
7
In the conflict that arises between the right of the competent terminal
patient to time his own death and the right of society to prolong death in
the interest of perserving life, there is, of course, disagreement over
whether society owes any reimbursement to the terminal patient and his
family for the full costs of being deprived his right to timing his own
death. But, granting the competent terminal patient the choice of when
he shall die need not conflict with society's concern to preserve life. Such
a patient who prefers a more rapid end should not have a continuation of
life forced upon him. The sanctity of life is not an absolute concept which
implies that society should deny the decision of a terminal patient who
elects euthanasia. That decision should really include both alternatives of
euthanasia-passive, for a prolonged death, or active, for a quicker
death-in order to allow the maximum choice of timing death so that the
patient will maintain what he regards as his dignity. 7 3
THE LIVING WILL
When an individual patient has no desire to be kept in a state of com-
plete and indefinite vegetated animation with no possibility of recovering
his mental and physical faculties, that individual, while still in control of
all his faculties and his ability to express himself, could still retain the
right of privacy over his body in determining whether he should be per-
mitted to die by way of a document known as a "living will,' 7 4 providing
'
7 J. S. MILL. ON LIBERTY 6, 8 (People's ed. 1873).
"'Marcus, supra note 10, at 1252.
"'lnformed Consent, supra note 2, at 1658, 1650.
'
14A typical living will may read as follows:
I,_ , of the City of __, State of ___, U.S.A., Declarant, being of
sound mind and disposing memory, herewith make this, my LIVING WILL,
to be effective upon the following conditions:
That when an event occurs wherein it appears that I am physically or
physiologically irreversibly ill, maimed or disabled, I request that a NON-
JUDICIAL BOARD be convened comprised of three duly accredited Doctors
of Medicine, a member of the Clergy of my faith (_), and two lay persons;
That after total evidence has been presented to my irreversible conditions,
and under my constitutional rights and my right to determine the integrity of
my person, I then direct and request that I be given any appropriate method
of EUTHANASIA. In so doing, I hold harmless and exonerate the members
of my EUTHANASIA BOARD, individually and collectively;
That in the event legislation is in force authorizing the existence and func-
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least two witnesses who would affirm that the declarant was of sound
mind and acted of his own free will.
Each individual case would be referred to a hospital committee, board,
or a committee of physicians which would consider circumstances under
which the document was made to determine the patient's intent and
whether or not his condition had reached the point where he would no
longer want treatment. If physicians found some doubts existedas to the
patient's intent, they could give treatment pending a resolution of the
matter-but a patient should not be compelled to undergo treatment,
such as taking certain drugs, receiving innoculations or therapy, or
undergoing surgery, expressly contrary to his will. In instances where a
hospital board might decline to assume responsibility, a patient's living
will could be adjudicated by courts and supported by medical and lay
testimony and evidence to create affirmative inactive termination of a pa-
tient's life.
These living wills by which persons of sound mind can specifically re-
quest no extraordinary life-preserving means be taken for their incurable
illnesses are not as yet legally binding,15 but thousands of Americans
have already signed them to express in advance their wishes to be
allowed to die when there is not reasonable expectation of recovery from
a disability. 7
6
The individual could carry this document on his person at all times,
while his wife, physician, lawyer, or confidant would have the original
copy. Personal possession of the document would create a strong
presumption that one regards it as binding. The document carried on the
patient's person could indicate what people should be contacted if the pa-
tient reaches a comatose state.
At any time before reaching the comatose state, an individual could
tioning of a EUTHANASIA BOARD, as suggested in substance above, I
agree to be bound by the legislative parameters.
I herewith subscribe to my LIVING WILL, this day of -, in the
presence of my twowitnesses who shall Attest to my sound mind and dispos-
ing memory and shall so Attest in my presence and the presence of each
other.
LIVING WILL DECLARANT
Address City
ATTESTED:
Name
Name
'
75Whittingham, supra note 1.
'11Reinhold, supra note 138, at 1.
Address City
Address City
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revoke the document; and, because statements or actions subsequent to
the written document might indicate contrary consent, if the maker of
the will is subsequently adjudged incompetent, the will would also be
revoked (though the revocation would not apply where incompetency
resulted from a medical condition contemplated in making the decision).
The approach of the living will here is analogous to the concept of a
revocable or conditional trust, with the patient's body as the res, the pa-
tient himself as the beneficiary and grantor, and the doctor and hospital
as trustees. The doctor is given authority to act as trustee of the patient's
body by virtue of the patient's consent to treatment. But the patient, as
grantor, is free at any time to revoke that trust relationship created
between him and the doctor. In creating the document, it is the intent of
the patient to cover contingencies wherein he would be able to grant or
withhold consent to treatment. That would include incompetency due to
mental illness. Mental illness might present a problem to the concept of
the living will, but the mentally ill patient has the same rights as any
other patient. So, via the will, an individual may anticipate mental illness
and limit his consent to treatment accordingly. If, in the course of that ill-
ness, the patient enters an incurable comatose state, treatment may
cease. The problem might arise in that a court may find the patient, upon
becoming mentally ill, to be incompetent and appoint a guardian for him.
Still, the will would remain in effect; the guardian could not nullify it.
Sometimes mentally ill patients have moments when their minds are
lucid. During such instances, he might indicate to his guardian or physi-
cian if he wishes the will revoked and the guardian could then act
accordingly to revoke the will.
To those who feel that living wills are too vague to offer any confidence
in the adequacy of their safeguards, it might be pointed out that these
documents could be individually tailored to mitigate some of the uncer-
tainties as to the actual intent under particular circumstances. 177 A
Jehovah's Witness, opposed to blood transfusions on religious principles,
could so provide in such a document. A Christian Scientist could indicate
he does not wish any medical treatment through such a document.
Further, living wills can only be made by adults capable of giving their
consent-patients who have a right to decide whether they will receive
treatment. That does not apply to minors, those institutionalized or ad-
judged incompetent. Nor could a parent acting on behalf of his child
make such a declaration, so that while an adult patient may himself
refuse to undergo an operation or receive a blood transfusion to save his
life, a parent could not deprive a child of such treatment.
As long as public policy does not condone euthanasia, the living will
may still be used as a means to direct a doctor to act passively through
inaction (thereby permitting the patient to die) in much the same way a
patient may refuse to sign the legal statement required to indicate his
consent to undergo surgery or other treatment.
'"Informed Consen, supra note 2, at 1664.
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